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I. INTRODUCTION 
When is it acceptable for a company to help consumers engage in fair 
use of copyrighted works? One might think that the answer would be: 
“always.” After all, a fair use is a privileged use, which copyright grants to 
consumers of copyrighted works.1 Consumers have the right, for example, 
to make personal copies of their CDs. If that is the case, then shouldn’t a 
company be entitled to help consumers make copies of CDs? Similarly, 
consumers have the right to make copies of television broadcasts for later 
viewing.2 Shouldn’t a company be entitled to help consumers do this in the 
most efficient way possible? Shouldn’t such a company, in fact, be lauded 
for making this process more efficient? 
In fact, courts quite frequently hold companies liable for helping con-
sumers engage in activities that would be fair or non-infringing uses if un-
                                                                                                                         
 © 2007 Joseph P. Liu. 
 † Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. 
 1. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 2. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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dertaken by consumers themselves. For example, courts have suggested 
that students should be entitled to make and assemble, on their own, cop-
ies of excerpts from various books and articles.3 But when a copy shop 
performs this task, the courts have held this to be infringing.4 Similarly, 
consumers are generally understood to have the right to skip over the por-
tions of a DVD they find objectionable or do not wish to see.5 This would 
likely extend to the right to make edits to the DVD for such a clearly per-
sonal and non-commercial purpose. But when a company facilitates this 
activity by selling already edited versions of the DVD, the courts have 
found this to be infringing.6 Most recently, a court held liable a cable 
company that stored broadcasts for later viewing on behalf of consumers,7 
despite the fact that such an activity would be fair use if a consumer did it 
in the privacy of his or her own home. 
What explains the courts’ dim view of companies that help consumers 
engage in fair or privileged uses? The structure of copyright doctrine pro-
vides an immediate explanation. In deciding such cases, courts generally 
apply the fair use defense to the activities of the companies, not the ulti-
mate consumers. So in the copy shop cases, for example, the courts find 
that the nature of the use is commercial, since the copy shop profits from 
the copying.8 The courts also frequently find that there is harm to the rele-
vant market, since in many cases these companies could have secured a 
license from the copyright owner.9 The fact that the use might have been 
fair if performed by a consumer is irrelevant. 
In many ways, the doctrinal explanation makes good policy sense. 
Many consumer uses are considered fair because they pose little harm to 
the market for the copyrighted work.10 The uses are, at least individually, 
small in scale. Moreover, the value of the uses is trivial in comparison to 
                                                                                                                         
 3. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs. (MDS), 99 F.3d 1381, 
1395 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 4. See id. 
 5. Family Movie Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 22 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Marybeth Peters, 
Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office of the U.S.). 
 6. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 
2006). 
 7. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 478 F. Supp. 
2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 8. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs. (MDS), 99 F.3d 1381 (6th 
Cir. 1996); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
 9. See, e.g., MDS, 99 F.3d at 1387. 
 10. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451-
52 (1984). 
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the costs that would be entailed if consumers were forced to seek authori-
zation for these uses.11 Under the familiar market-failure theory of fair use, 
copyright law should permit these uses.12 When third parties enter the pic-
ture, however, they make it far easier for consumers to engage in such 
uses. This potentially increases the amount of harm to the market for the 
work. It also reduces the potential licensing costs. Thus, copyright theory 
might well support such a result.13 
Although this perspective is in many ways quite valid, I argue in this 
Article that it is only partially correct. Specifically, the current judicial ap-
proach to such cases fails to take sufficient account of the interest that 
consumers have in engaging in fair or privileged uses. By conceiving of 
such uses as based largely on market failure, the existing approach finds it 
easy to allocate the benefits of efficiency to producers. However, if we 
view consumer uses as affirmative privileges that are based on more than 
simply market failure, then it becomes less clear why the benefits of effi-
ciency should not be enjoyed, at least in part, by consumers and by the 
companies that serve them.  
In this Article, I suggest a number of ways in which a more consumer-
oriented perspective might affect the way courts approach this question. 
Part II of this Article examines three specific areas in which courts have 
found companies liable for engaging in activities that would be fair uses if 
performed by consumers themselves. Part III analyzes the approach 
adopted by these courts and identifies situations where consumer fair use 
has a claim to be viewed as an affirmative entitlement. Finally, Part IV 
argues in favor of a more nuanced application of the fair use factors in 
such situations and explores some of the implications of the analysis for 
judicial decision making, as well as statutory initiatives such as the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act. 
II. WHOSE SHOES? 
Courts in copyright cases have generally been reluctant to allow com-
panies to “stand in the shoes” of their customers when it comes to fair 
                                                                                                                         
 11. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract 
in the Newtonian World of On-line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 (1997). 
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use.14 This Part describes a number of areas where courts have either re-
jected or failed to consider such arguments.  
A. Photocopying of Coursepacks 
Perhaps the most express consideration of the issue raised by this Arti-
cle can be found in the copy-shop cases: Princeton University Press v. 
Michigan Document Services (MDS)15 and Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s 
Graphics Corp.16 In MDS, the plaintiff, Princeton University Press, sued a 
photocopy store that produced coursepacks for university professors. The 
coursepacks consisted of photocopied collections of excerpts from copy-
righted books and articles chosen by the professor as readings for a par-
ticular course. The professors assembled the coursepacks, the copy shop 
reproduced the coursepacks, and students in the class purchased the 
coursepacks from the copy shops. The copy shop in MDS did not pay any 
licensing fees for the right to reproduce the copyrighted books and articles, 
and the plaintiff sued for copyright infringement.17 
The court of appeals in MDS, sitting en banc, rejected the defendant’s 
assertion of fair use. Applying the four fair use factors, the court held that 
(1) the nature and purpose of the use was both commercial and non-
transformative; (2) the amount of the copyrighted work used was substan-
tial; (3) the nature of the copyrighted works was creative and entitled to 
protection; and (4) the impact on the market was significant, insofar as the 
activity deprived the publisher of licensing fees that it was successful in 
obtaining from other copy shops.18 In reaching this result, the court ana-
lyzed the fair use defense from the perspective of the copy shop.  
MDS had argued that the court should adopt, or at least take into ac-
count, the perspective of the students. From such a perspective, the fair 
use status of the practice looks quite different. The practice, non-
commercial in nature and educational in purpose, is of precisely the type 
that fair use was originally designed to enable. Moreover, the impact on 
the market is not significant, insofar as students would not otherwise pur-
chase all of the original copyrighted works. MDS argued that it was 
                                                                                                                         
 14. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Entrepreneurial Copyright Fair Use: Let the 
Independent Contractor Stand in the Shoes of the User, 57 ARK. L. REV. 539 (2004). 
 15. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).  
 16. 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The facts of Basic Books are very similar to 
the facts of MDS. Accordingly, this Article will focus its discussion on the latter, without 
repeating the analysis for the former. 
 17. MDS, 99 F.3d at 1384. 
 18. Id. at 1386-90. 
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merely facilitating the fair use of the students, and that the court should 
take this into account in its fair use calculus.19 
One of the dissenting opinions noted the incongruity that the actions 
might well have been fair use if undertaken by the students themselves: 
That the majority lends significance to the identity of the person 
operating the photocopier is a profound indication that its ap-
proach is misguided. Given the focus of the Copyright Act, the 
only practical difference between this case and that of a student 
making his or her own copies is that commercial photocopying is 
faster and more cost-effective. Censuring incidental private sec-
tor profit reflects little of the essence of copyright law.20 
Another dissenting opinion was even more express: 
There is nothing in the statute that distinguishes between copies 
made for students by a third person who charges a fee for their 
labor and copies made by students themselves who pay a fee 
only for use of the copy machine. Our political economy gener-
ally encourages the division and specialization of labor. There is 
no reason why in this instance the law should discourage high 
schools, colleges, students and professors from hiring the labor 
of others to make their copies any more than there is a reason to 
discourage lawyers from hiring paralegals to make copies for 
clients and courts. The Court’s distinction in this case based on 
the division of labor—who does the copying—is short sighted 
and unsound economically. 
Our Court cites no authority for the proposition that the interven-
tion of the copyshop changes the outcome of the case. The Court 
errs by focusing on the “use” of the materials made by the copy-
shop in making the copies rather than upon the real user of the 
materials—the students. Neither the District Court nor our Court 
provides a rationale as to why the copyshops cannot “stand in the 
shoes” of their customers in making copies for noncommercial, 
educational purposes where the copying would be fair use if un-
dertaken by the professor or the student personally.21 
Thus, to the dissenting judges, MDS was merely making more effi-
cient the fair use that the students were otherwise entitled to engage in.  
The majority, however, rejected this argument: 
                                                                                                                         
 19. Id. at 1389. 
 20. Id. at 1393 (Martin, C.J., dissenting). 
 21. Id. at 1395 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
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Two of the dissents suggest that a copyshop merely stands in the 
shoes of its customers and makes no “use” of copyrighted mate-
rials that differs materially from the use to which the copies are 
put by the ultimate consumer. But subject to the fair use excep-
tion, 17 U.S.C. § 106 gives the copyright owner the “exclusive” 
right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies. . . .” And if 
the fairness of making copies depends on what the ultimate con-
sumer does with the copies, it is hard to see how the manufacture 
of pirated editions of any copyrighted work of scholarship could 
ever be an unfair use.22 
Thus, the court refused to consider or take into account the possibility 
that the students’ activities might constitute fair use.23 
While there may well be valid arguments against the position ad-
vanced by the dissenting opinions, the majority’s response seems some-
what weak. The majority seems to be concerned that allowing the copy 
shop to stand in the shoes of the students would provide no limiting prin-
ciple, i.e., that it would mean that copy shops could make wholesale cop-
ies of entire books. But this is not the case—the limiting principle would 
be the fair use rights of the students. Making a wholesale copy of an entire 
book would likely be infringing even if done by a student.24 Thus there is 
no real concern that allowing the copy shop to stand in the shoes of stu-
dents would lead to unlimited copying. Rather, the extent of the copy 
shop’s right would be measured by, and be coextensive with, the rights of 
the students.  
In a later portion of the opinion, the majority raised a more interesting 
objection. As noted above, the dissenting opinions argued that the copy 
shops were merely doing what the students were doing, but in a more effi-
cient manner, and that it would be incongruous to penalize them for mak-
ing the process more efficient. The majority responded by noting that 
other copy shops were able to serve this function while at the same time 
paying royalties to the publishers.25 
Unlike the earlier response, this response hits closer to the mark. Here, 
the court seemed to implicitly acknowledge that there was value in ena-
                                                                                                                         
 22. Id. at 1386 n.2. 
 23. Note that the court expressed no opinion about whether copying by the students 
would have been fair: “As to the proposition that it would be fair use for the students or 
professors to make their own copies, the issue is by no means free from doubt.” Id. at 
1389. 
 24. In such a case, the fair use factors would point largely against the student, par-
ticularly if the book were available for purchase. 
 25. Id. at 1389. 
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bling students to access coursepacks in a more efficient manner. However, 
it took issue with the argument that achieving this result required a fair use 
defense for the copy shops. Thus, for the majority, the question was not 
whether students could access coursepacks in an efficient manner, but 
whether the publishers would be compensated. 
Thus, in the end, the court expressly rejected the argument that the 
copy shop could stand in the shoes of the students.26  
B. Space-Shifting and Time-Shifting 
The same issue arises in cases involving space-shifting and time-
shifting. Consumers have a relatively well-established right to record tele-
vision broadcasts for later viewing, so-called time-shifting. They have also 
enjoyed, at least historically, the right to make personal copies of recorded 
music, so-called space-shifting. Both of these activities are generally con-
sidered fair use.27 
Yet in a number of cases, courts have imposed liability on companies 
that have sought to facilitate and make more efficient the consumer exer-
cise of these rights. In UMG Recordings v. MP3.com,28 for example, the 
defendant MP3.com provided a service whereby consumers could store, 
on MP3.com’s servers, music they had purchased on CDs. Consumers 
would place their CDs in the CD drive of their computer and then upload 
the music onto MP3.com’s servers. Consumers could then access the mu-
sic from any computer with an internet connection by signing onto the 
MP3.com site.29 
In fact, however, MP3.com did not copy the music from the con-
sumer’s CD. Instead, MP3.com had already made copies of many music 
album CDs, such as those produced by UMG, and stored these copies on 
                                                                                                                         
 26. Accord Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 582 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (citing MDS, 99 F.3d 1381) (establishing the proposition that “the end-user’s 
utilization of the product is largely irrelevant; instead, the focus is on whether alleged 
infringer’s use is transformative and/or commercial”); Video Pipeline, Inc., v. Buena 
Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 333-34 (D.N.J. 2002) (citing MDS, 99 
F.3d at 1389) (noting that company cannot stand in the shoes of customer for purposes of 
the first sale doctrine). See generally Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Trea-
tise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 581, 635-36 (2004) (tracing the source of the proposition that 
companies cannot stand in the shoes of their customers). 
 27. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Inc., 
545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480); Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001-10 (2000). 
 28. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 29. Id. at 350. 
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its servers. Whenever a consumer placed such a CD in his or her CD drive, 
MP3.com would verify that the CD contained the stored music. Then, 
rather than uploading the music onto its servers from the consumer’s CD, 
MP3.com would instead provide the consumer with access to the copies of 
the songs from the CD that already resided on MP3.com’s servers. Alter-
natively, if the consumer did not have a particular CD, he or she could 
purchase the CD from a cooperating online retailer. MP3.com would then 
provide access to its online copy.30 
UMG sued for copyright infringement, and the district court found 
MP3.com liable. In so doing, the court rejected MP3.com’s fair use argu-
ment. In evaluating the fair use factors, the court found that the use was 
commercial and non-transformative, that MP3.com copied the entire work, 
and that the nature of the work was creative.31 MP3.com had argued that 
its service did not harm the direct market for CDs and even had the effect 
of enhancing the market, insofar as it required the purchase of the CD. The 
court rejected this argument, noting: “Any allegedly positive impact of 
defendant’s activities on plaintiffs’ prior market in no way frees defendant 
to usurp a further market that directly derives from reproduction of the 
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.”32 In a separate opinion, the court awarded 
massive statutory damages to the plaintiffs.33 
The court in MP3.com never directly addressed the argument that 
MP3.com was merely facilitating the exercise of a consumer’s right. Ei-
ther MP3.com never made that argument or the court rejected it and ap-
plied the fair use factors without acknowledging any consumer interest. 
The court did note in passing, however, that: “Copyright . . . is not de-
signed to afford consumer protection or convenience but, rather, to protect 
the copyrightholders’ property interests.”34 
Although in a slightly different doctrinal setting, a recent case presents 
a similar issue in the context of time-shifting television broadcasts. In 
Twentieth Century Fox Corp. v. Cablevision Services,35 the cable company 
Cablevision introduced a service that allowed customers to record cable 
television broadcasts for later viewing. The service functioned like a per-
sonal video recorder such as TiVo. However, instead of recording the 
shows on a set-top box in the customer’s home, the service stored the re-
cordings centrally at Cablevision’s facilities. Cablevision’s computers al-
                                                                                                                         
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at. 351-53. 
 32. Id. at 352. 
 33. UMG Recordings, Inc., v. MP3.com, Inc., 2000 WL 1262568 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 34. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352. 
 35. 478 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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located space to each consumer and stored shows on that space in response 
to the customer’s choices about which shows to record.36 
The case thus presented many of the same issues raised in the 
MP3.com case, insofar as the activity would likely have been fair use if 
performed by the customer in his or her own home. However, in Cablevi-
sion, the court never addressed the fair use issue because Cablevision had 
waived its fair use defense in exchange for plaintiff’s waiver of a potential 
contributory liability claim. Instead, Cablevision argued that it was only 
passively enabling copying by consumers, and thus the consumers were 
the ones actually engaging in the act of copying.37 
The court rejected Cablevision’s argument, finding that Cablevision 
did more than passively facilitate copying by consumers. It pointed to the 
fact that Cablevision had extensive control over the means of copying and 
made decisions regarding when and how the copying would take place.38 
The court also distinguished Cablevision’s service from a consumer’s use 
of a personal video recorder, focusing largely on the technical differences 
between the two. It found that Cablevision’s system more closely resem-
bled a video-on-demand system, for which Cablevision paid royalties to 
the copyright owners.39 
Thus, in the end, the court refused to permit Cablevision to step into 
the shoes of its customers.40 The court’s analysis focused almost exclu-
sively on the actions of Cablevision itself and, in particular, on the techni-
cal details of Cablevision’s service. It did not consider the possibility that 
Cablevision’s service might represent a more efficient way for consumers 
to time-shift than through the use of set-top boxes. 
C. Bowdlerization of DVDs 
Another example of the same phenomenon appears in the debate over 
bowdlerized versions of movies on DVD. In recent years, a number of 
companies have begun offering to the public versions of movies on DVD 
that have been edited to remove or mask scenes that might be objection-
                                                                                                                         
 36. Id. at 612-16. 
 37. Id. at 617. 
 38. Id. at 618. 
 39. Id. at 618-19. 
 40. Accord Atl. Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., 2007 WL 136186, at 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (refusing, under the Audio Home Recording Act, to allow a distribu-
tor of an XM receiver plus recording MP3 player to step into the shoes of consumers who 
would otherwise be authorized to make recordings of broadcasts); Pac. & S. Co. v. Dun-
can, 572 F. Supp. 1186, 1194-95 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 744 F.2d 1490 
(11th Cir. 1984) (refusing to let operator of a TV news clipping service to stand in the 
shoes of its customers for fair use purposes).  
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able to certain segments of the public. A consumer mails a DVD to one of 
these companies. The company edits the movie to remove or mask objec-
tionable content (nudity, language, violence, etc.), and then sends back a 
disk containing the modified movie. The companies are generally careful 
to maintain a one-to-one ratio between purchased DVDs and edited cop-
ies.41 
A number of movie studios sued several such companies for copyright 
infringement. The district court rejected the companies’ fair use defense.42 
The court found the use to be commercial and rejected the argument that 
the edited versions of the copyrighted works were transformative.43 The 
court also held that the works were creative and that the companies had 
copied the entire works.44 Finally, the court rejected the argument that the 
use had no negative impact on the market. The defendants had argued that 
their use actually increased the market for such works, insofar as they re-
quired consumers to first purchase the unedited DVDs. Thus, many con-
sumers would not have purchased the DVDs but for the editing service. 
The court responded by noting that, even if this were the case, copyright 
owners should in any event have the right to decide whether or not they 
wished to enter this market.45 
Here too, the court never directly addressed the interests of the con-
sumers.46 Consumers presumably have the right to skip over or mute por-
tions of DVDs that they do not wish to see or hear.47 Consumers would 
                                                                                                                         
 41. See Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC, v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238-39 
(D. Colo. 2006). 
 42. Id. at 1242. 
 43. Id. at 1241. 
 44. Id. at 1241-42. 
 45. See id. at 1242. The court stated: 
The argument has superficial appeal but it ignores the intrinsic value of 
the right to control the content of the copyrighted work which is the es-
sence of the law of copyright. Whether these films should be edited in a 
manner that would make them acceptable to more of the public playing 
them on DVD in a home environment is more than merely a matter of 
marketing; it is a question of what audience the copyright owner wants 
to reach. 
Id. 
 46. The closest the court came was in rejecting statements from customers submit-
ted by the companies, touting the value of the services rendered. The court held that this 
interest was “inconsequential to copyright law and is addressed in the wrong forum.” Id. 
at 1240. 
 47. Hearing, supra note 5, at 22. Marybeth Peters, the Register of Copyrights, testi-
fied: 
Let me start with a proposition that I believe everybody can agree on. I 
do not believe anybody would seriously argue that an individual who is 
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also likely have a fair use right to modify DVDs they purchased in order to 
edit out objectionable portions.48 Thus, in a sense, the providers of bowd-
lerization services merely enable consumers to access works in a way that 
they would be entitled to under fair use. Indeed, the services would appear 
to be essential to the widespread exercise of these consumer rights, insofar 
as most consumers would not have the technical ability to make the re-
quired modifications. 
Unlike the courts, Congress expressly addressed the consumer interest 
in this area by passing the Family Movie Act of 2005.49 The Act allows 
companies to provide consumers with hardware and software that would 
permit consumers to mask or delete objectionable scenes in movies. Under 
the Act, companies can sell specially designed DVD players and provide 
files that the DVD player can use to alter or remove scenes from movies 
“on the fly,” that is, while the movie is being played and without making a 
permanent altered copy.50 The Family Movie Act thus represents an inter-
esting example of Congress expressly recognizing this consumer interest, 
albeit in a limited manner, and enacting a specific privilege furthering it. 
III. TRYING THEM ON FOR SIZE 
There may be good reasons for the courts in the cases presented above 
to prevent companies from stepping completely into the shoes of their cus-
tomers. The involvement of these companies may adversely affect the 
policies underlying copyright, such as the incentive to create expressive 
works. At the same time, courts have been too quick to dismiss the inter-
ests of consumers in these cases. Section A analyzes and critiques the 
cases presented above and suggests modifications that would take greater 
account of consumer interests in fair use. Section B then discusses some 
situations in which these modifications might be particularly appropriate. 
                                                                                                                         
watching a movie in his or her living room should be forbidden to press 
the mute button on a remote control in order to block out language that 
he or she believes is offensive. Nor should someone be forbidden to 
fast-forward past a scene that he or she does not wish to see. And cer-
tainly parents have the right to press the mute and fast-forward buttons 
to avoid exposing their children to material that they believe is inap-
propriate. 
Id. 
 48. But see infra Section IV.B (discussing effect of the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act). 
 49. Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218, 223-24 (2005) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 110). 
 50. Cf. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 
1992) (finding no infringement for device that altered gameplay “on the fly”). 
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A. Critique and Modifications 
As a doctrinal matter, it is hard to fault the approach adopted by the 
courts above. In many of the examples above, a company defended itself 
against claims of copyright infringement by asserting a fair use defense. 
When analyzing the entitlement to fair use in these situations, it makes 
sense to prefer the perspective of the defendant company itself to the per-
spective of the ultimate consumer. After all, the company, not the con-
sumer, is the party charged with infringement. And nothing in the statu-
tory fair use provision expressly directs a court to consider the interests of 
third parties such as the consumer.51  
The fair use defense, however, does not rule out consideration of the 
interests of third parties, such as the consumer in the above cases. The 
statutory factors are not expressly limited to actions taken by the defen-
dant.52 Moreover, fair use is ultimately a very flexible doctrine, and courts 
are given much discretion in applying it to specific cases.53 
The question, therefore, is whether copyright policy warrants consid-
eration of third-party interests. From a policy perspective, there may be 
good reasons not to permit companies to step fully into the shoes of their 
consumers when raising a fair use defense. Many fair uses are small-scale 
uses that have little impact, at least individually, on broader copyright in-
centives. Moreover, the cost of licensing such individual uses may greatly 
exceed the value of such uses. Thus, permitting small-scale uses may per-
mit greater dissemination of copyrighted works without a corresponding 
reduction in copyright incentives.54 
When companies step in to facilitate such uses, however, both sides of 
this equation change. The defendant companies above make it far more 
efficient for consumers to engage in the uses in question. Given the re-
duced cost of the activity to the consumer, this might have the effect of 
increasing the extent to which consumers engage in such uses. A more 
widespread practice might pose a greater threat to the direct market for the 
copyrighted work. Thus, ultimately there may be a greater adverse impact, 
in the aggregate, on copyright incentives. So, for example, if students had 
to assemble their own coursepacks, we might expect the inconvenience 
associated with the practice to limit the extent to which it is adopted. On 
                                                                                                                         
 51. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 52. Id. 
 53. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 9-10 (1976) (“Beyond a very broad statutory explana-
tion of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to 
adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 54. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 1618. 
2007] ENABLING COPYRIGHT CONSUMERS 1111 
the other hand, if the copy shops streamline the process, we might expect 
greater student adoption of this process and, correspondingly, a greater 
reduction in sales of the underlying books and articles. 
In addition, the participation of the company may reduce potential li-
censing costs. The company acts as a locus for licensing. It has greater re-
sources than the individual consumers and derives a profit from the activ-
ity. It can thus afford to seek out the copyright owners and negotiate li-
censes for the activity. So, for example, a copy shop will find it far easier 
to negotiate blanket copying licenses than the individual students or pro-
fessors. Hence, for fair use purposes, there may be good reasons to treat 
companies differently than the consumers they serve. 
Note, however, that this perspective depends on a certain view of con-
sumer fair use. Under this view, fair use by consumers is a very tenuous 
entitlement. It is justified solely by the fact that there is no efficient way to 
make the consumers pay for the use. If there were a way to eliminate the 
inefficiency, then under this view the use would be foreclosed. In the 
above examples, once a company steps in to eliminate the inefficiency, the 
entitlement is automatically re-allocated to the copyright owner. Con-
sumer fair use is thus, in many ways, a residual and very contingent enti-
tlement.55 
If we adopt a different view of consumer fair use, however, the results 
in the above cases make far less sense. Suppose we viewed consumer fair 
use as an affirmative entitlement—less like an immunity from liability, 
and more like an affirmative right. For example, what if we thought that it 
was an affirmatively good thing for students to be able to assemble their 
own customized packages of readings from copyrighted articles and 
books? Or what if we believed that it was an affirmatively good thing for 
purchasers of DVDs to be able to edit their purchases for personal con-
sumption in ways that they saw fit? 
The activities of the companies look very different in this light. Instead 
of engaging in widespread infringement or free-riding off of the labor of 
the copyright owners, the companies serve the valuable function of ena-
bling consumers to exercise their rights. They step in to eliminate an inef-
ficiency in the marketplace. Moreover, the profit that they earn from this 
activity is what motivates them to seek out and address these market inef-
ficiencies. It is both their reward and their incentive.56 
                                                                                                                         
 55. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights 
Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998). 
 56. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1393-94 
(6th Cir. 1996) (Martin, C.J., dissenting). 
1112 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1099  
Such a perspective addresses one of the somewhat odd results of the 
existing approach. Under the existing approach, fair use depends on the 
existence of inefficiency. It is justified by the inefficiency. Thus, once a 
company steps in to eliminate that inefficiency, the use is no longer fair. 
This gives rise to some perverse incentives on the part of these companies 
to maintain some level of inefficiency in their dealings. Thus, in the ex-
ample of the cable company and the personal video recorder, the doctrine 
gives the company incentives to maintain a more inefficient method of 
recording.57 It is somewhat odd that the doctrine punishes attempts to 
make a process more efficient for consumers. If we adopt a more con-
sumer-oriented view, however, this tension is resolved, as the cable com-
pany is viewed as providing a valuable service to consumers. 
B. Some Examples 
Of course, this all raises the question: is there a basis for viewing con-
sumer fair use as an affirmative entitlement rather than an entitlement 
triggered solely by market failure? Here, I think, is where the existing ap-
proach falls short in failing to consider that, in some cases, the answer to 
this question may be yes. That is, there may be reasons in some cases to 
view the fair use engaged in by consumers as more than merely a residual 
right that grudgingly exists only when the market has not found a way to 
make consumers pay. 
In some cases, we might view the consumer fair use as an affirmative 
entitlement because it serves certain non-market values that justify and 
underlie fair use more generally.58 Take, for example, the copy shop 
cases.59 Unlike the majority opinion, the dissenting opinions view the con-
sumer use as an affirmative entitlement or good. The ultimate users of the 
coursepacks, the students, are using them for educational purposes. This is 
a good thing, a broad purpose that fair use is designed to promote.60 Under 
this view, then, the copy shops are facilitating this beneficial use by the 
ultimate consumers. They are enabling the consumers to efficiently exer-
cise their affirmative entitlements.  
Under this view, it seems particularly odd to automatically allocate the 
benefits of this efficiency to the copyright owners. This is what underlies 
                                                                                                                         
 57. See Ed Felten, Cablevision and Anti-Efficiency Policy, FREEDOM TO TINKER, 
Apr. 18, 2007, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1144. 
 58. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair 
Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997). 
 59. See supra, Section II.A. 
 60. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (“[F]or purposes such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching, scholarship, or research. . . .”). 
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the difference between the majority and dissenting opinions. The dissent-
ing opinions repeatedly focus on the fact that the copy shops are merely 
helping the students engage in an ultimately desirable activity. The major-
ity opinion, by contrast, views the student activities more skeptically and 
accordingly treats the copy shops far less favorably. 
In other cases, we might view the consumer fair use from the perspec-
tive of consumer autonomy in the consumption of copyrighted works.61 
So, for example, in the bowdlerization cases, there seems to be a persistent 
belief that consumers should have a basic right to control how and when 
they view movies on DVDs. The Register of Copyrights testified to this 
effect,62 and Congress recognized this in the passage of the Family Movie 
Act of 1995. If this is the case, then it becomes harder to understand why 
companies should be prevented from helping consumers exercise this af-
firmative entitlement. After all, under this view, the companies that pro-
vide consumers with edited DVDs are simply enabling consumers to ef-
fectively exercise rights that we wish them to have. 
Yet another consumer interest might be an interest in being able to 
manipulate and transform digital works. As many have recognized, con-
sumers have an interest in interacting with copyrighted works in more 
complex ways.63 Because this interest is greatly facilitated by digital tech-
nology,64 consumers are able to engage in an unprecedented level of crea-
tivity. This results in a broader and richer cultural environment, one with 
often quirky and unexpected results. If we consider this to be an affirma-
tive good, then companies that facilitate this kind of creativity should be 
viewed more favorably. At the very least, they should have the opportu-
nity to argue that they are facilitating the exercise of valuable consumer 
rights. 
In this light, take the example of YouTube.65 Many of the video clips 
posted by users of YouTube contain copyrighted materials. Some of these 
materials are merely copies of commercially produced copyrighted works. 
Others, however, include some degree of additional creative expression. 
For example, there are many clips in which copyrighted music serves as a 
backdrop to lip-synching, dancing, or other activities. Such YouTube users 
                                                                                                                         
 61. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 
397 (2003); Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
347 (2005). 
 62. Hearing, supra note 5, at 22 (testimony of Marybeth Peters). 
 63. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 61. 
 64. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECH-
NOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004). 
 65. See YouTube, http://www.youtube.com (last visited August 26, 2007). 
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can likely assert the defense of fair use, as their use is non-commercial and 
transformative, and no easily accessible licensing markets for these uses 
exist. However, YouTube makes the creation and dissemination of this 
material far more efficient. YouTube could also potentially negotiate some 
kind of blanket license on behalf of its users. Yet before concluding that 
YouTube should be required to do so, YouTube should be entitled to ar-
gue that it is facilitating the fair use rights of its users. 
Now, to say that courts should take the consumer perspective more se-
riously is not to say that the consumer perspective should always triumph. 
It may be that, in some cases, the facilitation of fair use by such companies 
has too great of an adverse impact on copyright incentives. The benefits of 
recognizing and facilitating consumer fair uses must be weighed against 
such a potential effect. But as a general matter, the analysis above suggests 
that courts should at least consider the possibility that the consumer fair 
use at issue may be an affirmative entitlement and that companies may 
have a legitimate interest in making the exercise of such an entitlement 
more efficient.   
IV. HOW DO I LOOK? 
So how might copyright look in these cases if courts took more seri-
ously the consumer interest? This Part explores and attempts to flesh out 
the implications of the above analysis for fair use case law and recent 
copyright legislation. 
A. For Case Law 
The adoption of a more consumer-conscious perspective on these 
cases would have several effects on how courts apply fair use analysis in 
these kinds of cases. First, courts would adjust their view of the purpose 
and character of the use—the use by the ultimate consumer would be rele-
vant in such an inquiry. Courts would have to expressly consider whether 
the use engaged in by the consumer was an affirmative entitlement, or 
whether it was more of a residual right. If it were an affirmative entitle-
ment, then the commercial nature of the company’s use would be far less 
relevant. The compensation to the company would be seen as an appropri-
ate reward for making the exercise of the entitlement more efficient. On 
the other hand, if the ultimate use engaged in by the consumer occurs 
more because of an inability to license, then the commercial nature of the 
company’s use would remain quite relevant. 
This would require courts to make substantive distinctions between 
different types of consumer uses. So, for example, in the copy shop cases, 
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courts would have to affirmatively decide whether student copying of 
journal articles and book excerpts is, in itself, fair use. A court could cer-
tainly conclude that it is not, and therefore the copy shops should get no 
special consideration. Yet at the very least, courts should be required to 
engage in this analysis. This would force courts to adopt a broader per-
spective by preventing the narrow application of the fair use factors to 
only the company at issue. 
Second, courts would look more carefully at the harm to the market 
factor. In some cases, even if the activities of the companies facilitate ex-
ercise of an affirmative fair use right, there might be too great a harm to 
the direct market for the work. So, for example, in the MP3.com case, 
there might be a quite reasonable fear that the actions of MP3.com not 
only make space-shifting more efficient, but also facilitate copying that 
would clearly not be fair use (for example, use of a single CD by several 
different people to gain access to multiple copies of a copyrighted song). 
Or, in the copy shop cases, it is possible that facilitating the student use of 
coursepacks might in the end so undermine the market for books and arti-
cles that this would outweigh the benefits from greater exercise of fair 
use.66 
However, such claims should be critically examined and not simply 
uncritically accepted. Viewing a consumer use as an affirmative entitle-
ment would lead courts to more carefully assess claims of market harm by 
forcing them to weigh that harm against a competing consumer interest. 
Thus, if it turned out that, due to the peculiarities of the market for aca-
demic publishing, coursepacks would not have a significant impact on the 
production of academic works, this would support the entitlement of the 
copy shops. At the very least, once a consumer interest is identified, there 
is a reason for courts to engage in a more thorough inquiry into the impact 
of the use on the market. 
Moreover, courts would more carefully scrutinize claims of lost licens-
ing revenue and would not automatically credit such claims. Viewed from 
the perspective of the consumer, it is far less clear why the loss of poten-
tial licensing revenue should be considered market harm. In effect, this is a 
question regarding the allocation of the benefits from more efficient con-
sumer fair use. If a court views the consumer fair use as an affirmative 
                                                                                                                         
 66. See Los Angeles News Service v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 797-99 (9th Cir. 1992); 
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good, then the company facilitating the use may have a greater claim to 
the proceeds from the increased efficiency. 
Consider the bowdlerization example. The companies in these cases 
are careful to maintain a one-to-one ratio of edited-to-original DVDs. Ac-
cordingly, there is no realistic claim of harm to the direct market. Indeed, 
there is a very good claim that the service benefits the direct market by 
enabling purchases by consumers who would otherwise have avoided pur-
chasing the DVD in the first place. Moreover, the claim of harm to the 
market via licensing seems particularly weak, given that the copyright 
owners have not sought to exploit this market, and the companies in these 
cases should share in the benefits of a service that enables consumers to 
more efficiently exercise their right to view movies in the manner they 
wish. 
Finally, courts may consider the possibility of withholding injunctive 
relief and instead awarding some level of damages. In some cases, a court 
might well conclude that the benefits from more efficient consumer fair 
use should be shared between the company and the copyright owner. 
Where a court believes that bargaining would not result, a court could 
award damages rather than an injunction. This might give more incentive 
to companies to look for opportunities to help consumers exercise their 
fair use rights. 
Ultimately, a consumer-conscious perspective would require courts to 
take more seriously the argument that a supposedly infringing company is 
instead actually facilitating a consumer’s exercise of fair use rights. Al-
though such a result would not always allow companies to step into the 
shoes of their customers, it would at least allow them to briefly slip the 
shoes on to see if they fit. 
B. For the DMCA and DRM 
While the analysis in the preceding section focused on the fair use de-
fense, it is worth asking how recent changes to the copyright laws, namely 
the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, affect this analy-
sis.67 To some extent, the DMCA places another potential barrier to the 
more effective exercise of consumer fair use. Many copyright owners are 
increasingly deploying technologies to restrict the ability of consumers to 
copy or freely manipulate digital copies of copyrighted works. The 
DMCA imposes liability for the circumvention of these technological 
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measures.68 It also bars the sale of technologies that have limited uses 
other than to enable circumvention.69 
The DMCA thus stands in the way of many attempts by consumers to 
exercise their fair use rights. Take the bowdlerization example. I have ar-
gued above that we should recognize a right on the part of consumers to 
control how and when they watch a movie, and that this right likely ex-
tends to a fair use right to modify movies on DVD for personal consump-
tion. Yet most consumers will not be able to do so because DVDs are en-
crypted. Thus, they do not have the technical ability to exercise their fair 
use rights.70 
Moreover, even if a particular consumer did have such technical abil-
ity, he or she would be barred from exercising it by the DMCA, since do-
ing so would constitute the illegal act of circumvention. The DMCA, 
unlike copyright more generally, does not contain a fair use defense. So 
even if the underlying use were to be fair, there would be no defense to the 
act of circumvention unless the use fell within a specific exemption or ex-
clusion.71 And even if consumers were to somehow obtain an exemption, 
they would have no access to technologies that would enable them to take 
advantage of the exemption. 
Thus, in the end, the DMCA may obviate much of the above analysis, 
at least for works that are routinely protected by technological protection 
measures. In such cases, the role played by companies that facilitate fair 
uses would be even more vital, since most individuals likely do not have 
the technical expertise required to overcome the technological protection 
measures. Yet any company that facilitated such uses by individuals 
would likely run afoul of the DMCA. And, unlike the case with copyright, 
there is no general fair use defense available for these companies to lever-
age.72 
The effect of the DMCA, therefore, is to largely disable consumers 
from exercising rights they would otherwise possess under fair use. If fair 
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uses are residual rights justified only by inefficiency, then we might not 
care about this effect, since new technologies will presumably make li-
censing less costly and eliminate the justification for fair use. However, if 
fair uses have independent value and are not just residual rights, then the 
DMCA acts as a practical limit on the ability of companies to step in and 
make such uses more efficient and accessible. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that courts should be more sympathetic to 
attempts by companies to invoke the fair use rights of their customers. To 
the extent that we view some consumer fair uses as affirmative entitle-
ments, consumer fair use arguments by the supposedly infringing compa-
nies that facilitate the exercise of such entitlements should be treated more 
favorably. Although such arguments should not always be dispositive, 
courts should at least carefully evaluate them. 
